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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal stems from the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff-Appellant Jackie

Raymond’s claims

against Defendant-Respondent Idaho State Police (ISP).

Ms. Raymond’s

underlying Complaint sets forth two alternate causes 0f action against ISP regarding their
investigation 0f a

motor vehicle accident involving Ms. Raymond’s father and Fayette Deputy

Scott Sloan.1 R. V01.

I,

pp. 34-35,

W 23-31.

Those causes 0f action are speciﬁcally

Count H, “Tortious Interference with Prospective Action” and Count
“Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage.” Id.

both claims against ISP for failure to

state a

The

III

entitled:

(in the alternative)

district court

dismissed

claim pursuant t0 Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6).

In support 0f her claims,

Ms. Raymond’s Complaint

allegations against all “defendants.” R. Vol.

that during ISP’S investigation

I,

0f the accident,

sets forth, in three paragraphs,

pp. 32-33, 1N 17-19.
all

Ms. Raymond

alleges that,

defendants conspired to interfere or impede or

inﬂuence the criminal investigation of Deputy Sloan.

Id.

Ms. Raymond further alleges

that the

defendants’ acts “thereby reduced the value of Plaintiff’s claim and increased the cost in

pursuing the claim.” V01.

Raymond

relies

I,

p. 32,

11

19. Speciﬁcally, in

0n a chain 0f hypotheticals

t0

paragraph 19 0f her Complaint, Ms.

demonstrate that she was injured by defendants’

alleged interference in the criminal investigation:

[D]efendants conspired

t0,

and

did, conceal

and manipulate evidence, intimidate

Witnesses, and otherwise interfered with the prosecution, thereby causing the

But for the defendants’ cover-up and
interference as alleged herein, the matter would have proceeded to trial and Sloan
would have been convicted. Such conviction would have rendered liability in this
prosecutor t0

dismiss

the

charges.

1

Deputy Sloan and Fayette County remained defendants in the underlying civil wrongﬁll
stipulated judgment for dismissal was entered after Ms.
death lawsuit after ISP’S dismissal.

A

Raymond

subsequently reached a settlement with those defendants.

matter resjudiciata. The absence 0f such a conviction exponentially increased the
cost of proving liability in Plaintiff’s civil case and because 0f the defendants’

made

evidence tampering has
Plaintiff’s civil

it

more

difﬁcult

t0

claim signiﬁcantly less valuable than

making
otherwise would have

prove
it

liability,

been.

V01.

I,

p. 32,

In

State

1]

19 (underline emphasis added).

Count

II,

Ms. Raymond

and Federal criminal

statutes

“disrupt Plaintiff’s case.” R. V01.

were “negligent per se” under Idaho

asserts that defendants

and willfully destroyed or concealed evidence

I,

p. 34,

in

an effort to

W 24-27. Ms. Raymond describes such disruption as

“a massive increase in costs 0f pursuing liability 0f the wrongful death claims, a potential loss in
the value of the claim, accruing interest

from the signiﬁcant delay

general damages, including severe emotional distress.” R. V01.

III,

Ms. Raymond alleges

destroyed, 0r disrupted

Raymond

I,

p. 35,

1]

interference. R. V01.

Count

I,

p. 35,

1N 29-30. As a

result,

Ms.

been signiﬁcantly

the defendants for failure t0 state a claim, the district court dismissed

for tortious interference With a prospective action

it

27. Similarly, in

31.

With an economic advantage. R. V01.

because

1]

0f the claim, and

had a valid economic expectation Which was reduced,

by defendants’

Upon motion by
II

p. 34,

asserts her “ability t0 obtain legal redress for [her] injuries has

impaired.” R. V01.

Count

that she

I,

in resolution

I,

pp.

and Count

III

for tortious interference

112-113. The district court dismissed Count

II

found that Idaho has not recognized a cause of action for tortious interference with

prospective action. R. V01.

I,

pp. 111-1 12. Recognizing the existence 0f the tort 0f interference

with an economic advantage, the

district court nevertheless

dismissed Count

III,

concluding that

“a civil lawsuit does not represent the kind 0f noncommercial relationship and prospective

economic advantage protected by the
advantage.” R. V01.

I,

p. 113.

The

tort

district court

0f intentional interference With an economic

went 0n

t0

hold that dismissal 0f both Counts

II

and

III

was appropriate because those claims were each “premised 0n a

fact that the Plaintiff

cannot prove: that but for the Defendants’ alleged misconduct, Sloan would have been convicted

0f manslaughter.”

Id.

The

district court

determined that “speculating about one possible outcome

in Sloan’s criminal case is not a basis for relief in this civil case.” Id.

On August

17,

2018, Ms.

Raymond ﬁled

her Notice of Appeal, implying that she

intended t0 appeal the district court’s dismissal Counts

Raymond

II

and

described the preliminary statement 0f the issues 0n appeal

err in dismissing the plaintiff’s tortious interference claims against

Raymond’s Nature 0f the Case

as:

“Did the

district court

defendant Idaho State Police

under Rule 12(b)(6) 0f the Idaho Rules 0f Civil Procedure?” R. V01.
added). Similarly, Ms.

0f her Complaint. Ms.

III

p. 125,

1.,

1]

3A

(emphasis

section 0f her Appellant’s Brief states that

she “appeals the decision 0f the district court t0 dismiss her

m

against defendant Idaho State

Police (ISP) ...” Appellant’s Brief, p. 4 (emphasis added).

The

on Appeal

Issues Presented

reference the dismissal of Count

Appellant’s Brief, p.
that the dismissal

8.

Similarly,

of Count

III

argument section 0f her brief

Claim of

III,

in

Ms. Raymond’s Appellant’s

tortious

interference With

10.

however,

economic advantage. See

was

error. See,

is entitled,

e.g.,

Appellant’s Brief, pp. 10-13. The ﬁrst

“The Complaint

States Sufﬁcient Facts t0 Support a

Ms. Raymond does not argue

by Spoliation 0f Evidence.”

that her

Complaint’s allegations

sufﬁciently stated a claim for the existent tort of interference with economic advantage.

Ms. Raymond makes vague references
claim 0r claims.” See,

e.g.

M

Ms. Raymond’s Appellant’s Brief is devoid 0f any argument

Intentional Interference with Prospective Civil Action

Appellant’s Brief, pp.

Brief,

that her

Appellants Brief, p.

At most,

Complaint pled “an allowable and recognized
9.

Ms. Raymond’s second main argument 0n

appeal asks this Court t0 fashion a

new

tort

from “ISP’S intentional 0r reckless conduct as

alleged. .” Appellant’s Brief, p. 15.
.

Thus, ISP cannot prepare a
district court erred

whether an issue
issue

is

is

by dismissing

its

full

response t0 Ms. Raymond’s vague assertions that the

tortious interference claims. Furthermore, “[r]egardless 0f

explicitly set forth in the party’s brief as

one 0f the issues 0n appeal,

if the

only mentioned in passing and not supported by any cogent argument or authority,

cannot be considered by

this Court.”

Bergeman

v.

Select Portfolio Servicing, 164 Idaho 498,

it

432

P.3d 47, 50 (2018)(internal citations omitted). Nevertheless, in an abundance 0f caution, ISP Will
address the district court’s dismissal 0f Count

III in

Section IV, below.

ISSUE PRESENTED

ON APPEAL

Defendant ISP presents the following additional issue 0n appeal:

Has Ms. Raymond pursued

this

appeal frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation,

therefore entitling Defendant ISP to attorney fees and costs

0n appeal?

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
ISP should be awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant

to

Idaho Appellate

Rules 41, Idaho Rule 0f Civil Procedure 54, and Idaho Code §12-121. Attorney fees and costs 0n
appeal are appropriate under I.A.R. 41, I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1), and I.C. § 12-121, only if this Court
left

is

with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and

without foundation. Stanley

v.

McDaniel, 134 Idaho 630, 633, 7 P.3d 1107, 1110 (2000) Where

an appeal turns 0n questions of law, an award of attorney fees under these sections
the law

is

well settled and the appellant has

made no

substantial

showing

is

proper

if

that the district court

misapplied the law. Id.; see also, Stiles v. Amundson, 160 Idaho 530, 534, 376 P.3d 734, 738
(2016) (arguments must be well-reasoned and have at least some precedential support).
Here, Ms. Raymond has not pointed to any misapplication of the law by the district court.
Further, Ms. Raymond asks this Court to change well-established law and adopt a cause of action
based on hypotheticals and damages that cannot be proven on the facts of this case. Ms.
Raymond’s appeal was also brought without foundation because, despite her contentions to the
contrary, she has pursued and reached a settlement with the other defendants in the underlying
case, thereby mooting any argument that ISP’s alleged actions or inactions interfered with or
terminated her right to recovery in that case. Attorney fees are further warranted because this
appeal inappropriately seeks to re-litigate issues that have been resolved by a settlement with
other parties to the underlying case.
ARGUMENT
I.

Standard of review

This Court reviews an order dismissing an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim, de novo. Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 832, 243 P.3d 642, 648 (2010). Rule
8(a)(2) requires a complaint to contain a “a short and plain statement of the claim” showing that
the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Thus, on review of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, this Court
determines whether the non-moving party has alleged sufficient facts in support of their claim,
which if true, would entitle them to relief. Idaho Wool Growers Ass’n, Inc. v. State, 154 Idaho
716, 720, 302 P.3d 341, 345 (2012) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “In doing so, the
Court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Id.

5

The

II.

when

court did not err

district

it

dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for

ISP because
Idaho has not recognized such a tort and Ms. Raymond does not have
standing t0 pursue such a claim.
intentional interference With a prospective civil action against

Ms. Raymond acknowledges
civil action

of intentional interference With a prospective

has not been adopted as an independent cause 0f action by Idaho courts. Appellant’s

Brief, p. 10.

When

and declined

dismissing Ms. Raymond’s claim, the district court acknowledged this fact

to recognize a

because n0 such independent
state

that the tort

new

tort,

tort exists

within

its

discretion. R. Vol.

I,

p.

112. Accordingly,

under Idaho law, Ms. Raymond’s Complaint failed t0

an appropriate claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and was properly dismissed. Even

if

such an

independent cause of action existed in Idaho, Ms. Raymond’s tortious interference with
prospective civil action claim

alleged injury

was based 0n

was supported by only conclusory,

several hypotheticals.

standing t0 bring her claim, Which further warrants

A.

Ms. Raymond
its

had

dismissal as a matter of law.

that the tort

0f intentional interference With a

spoliation of evidence, While not formally adopted, has

therefore, the district court’s dismissal

case,

failed t0 establish that she

A claim for intentional spoliation has not been recognized in Idaho.

Ms. Raymond argues

Supreme Court

speculative allegations, and her

Yoakum

v.

was

in error.

Hartford Fire

been recognized by Idaho

Ms. Raymond

Ins. C0.,

civil action

relies

courts,

and

upon a 1996 Idaho

129 Idaho 171, 173, 923 P.2d 416, 418

(1996), for the proposition that the tort 0f intentional interference With a civil action

actionable tort in Idaho.

by

is

an

A careful reading of Yoakum reveals that this Court did not adopt such a

tort.

In

Yaakum, parents 0f a minor sued a

committed wrongful, criminal
Idaho

at

city’s insurance

acts in its investigation

174, 923 P.2d at 419.

company, alleging

that the insurer

of the minor’s wrongful death claim. 129

Speciﬁcally, the parents alleged that an insured’s private

investigator improperly changed his initial causation opinions and that the insurer’s claims
manager inappropriately contacted and threatened an underage witness. Id. Before bringing their
suit against the insurer, the parents brought a wrongful death claim against the city, which they
settled by accepting the city’s offer of judgment. Id. After settling the wrongful death claim, the
parents filed suit against the insurer asserting various causes of action, including spoliation of
evidence, intentional harm to a property interest, and violations of several criminal statutes. Id.
The district court dismissed the parents’ claims that were based on criminal statutes and
later awarded summary judgment to the insurer on the remaining civil claims. Id. at 174-75, at
419-20. The parents appealed the district court’s dismissal of their claims and this Court
affirmed. Id., at 180, at 425. Specifically concerning the parents’ claim for “spoliation of
evidence,” this Court recognized that such a tort had not been expressly adopted in Idaho. Id., at
177-78, at 422-23. Nevertheless, the Court went on to find that an essential element of that claim
was not present; namely, that the insurer willfully destroyed evidence. Id., at 178, at 423. The
Court declined to adopt a tort of intentional harm to a property interest due to the circumstances
of that case, despite the “guidelines” available in the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 870, 871,
for “fashioning the contours of new intentional torts a court may wish to create.” Id.
In dicta, this Court took “the opportunity to opine on a possible cause of action for
conduct more egregious than that presented here.” Id. Relying on a California Court of Appeal
case (Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d 491, 500, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 835 (Ct. App.
1984), disapproved of by Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511 (1998), and a
Supreme Court of Alaska case (Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 463 (Alaska
1986)), the Court analogized the “possible” cause of action for “intentional interference with
prospective civil action by spoliation of evidence” to the tort of “intentional interference with a

7

prospective economic advantage,” which had been previously recognized in Idaho. Id., at 17879, at 423-24. Relying on Hazen, this Court opined that, even if it were to recognize the tort of
spoliation, the record before it did not reveal that the insurer’s threatening and coercive conduct
was an unreasonable interference with the parent’s previously-settled wrongful death claim. Id.,
at 179, at 424.
This Court has continued to hold that the tort of spoliation had not been expressly
adopted in Idaho. See Ricketts v. E. Idaho Equip., Co., 137 Idaho 578, 581, 51 P.3d 392, 395–96
(2002) (disposal of evidence did not show the requisite plan or premeditation to establish
spoliation); Cook v. State, Dep't of Transp., 133 Idaho 288, 298, 985 P.2d 1150, 1160 (1999)
(spoliation claim alleging defendant had intentionally or negligently “secreted, destroyed, lost or
mislaid” evidence was dismissed for failure to file a tort claim). In yet other cases decided after
Yoakum, this Court recognized the “spoliation doctrine,” not as an independent tort, but rather as
a “general principle of civil litigation which provides that upon a showing of intentional
destruction of evidence by an opposing party, an inference arises that the missing evidence was
adverse to the party’s position.” Waters v. All Phase Const., 156 Idaho 259, 263, 322 P.3d 992,
996 (2014). See also, Courtney v. Big O Tires, Inc., 139 Idaho 821, 823, 87 P.3d 930, 932
(2003); Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 812, 979 P.2d 1165, 1170 (1999).
In each case where the destruction or concealment of evidence was alleged to have taken
place, this Court declined to expressly adopt the tort of intentional interference with a civil action
by spoliation of evidence. Indeed, Idaho courts have never recognized spoliation in the context
presented in the instant appeal – when a plaintiff alleges that a third party’s alleged “spoliation”
in a criminal prosecution constituted intentional interference with a plaintiff’s prospective civil
action. Accordingly, because Idaho has not expressly recognized the tort of interference with a

8

by dismissing Count

prospective civil action, the district court did not err

Complaint for

Ms. Raymond’s alleged injury is based on pure speculation and therefore
she does not have standing t0 pursue her claim against ISP.

if that

such a claim has been recognized in Idaho, Ms.

sufﬁcient facts, which, if true,

Raymond

0f Ms. Raymond’s

failure to state a claim.

B.

Even

II

would

entitle

her to

relief.

Raymond

has not alleged

See I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). Speciﬁcally, Ms.

lacks standing t0 pursue her claim for intentional interference 0f a prospective civil

action, as her allegations

d0 not demonstrate an

injury-in-fact.

This Court recently described the requirement 0f standing, as follows:
is a fundamental tenet 0f American Jurisprudence that a person Wishing t0
invoke a court’s jurisdiction must have standing. In order t0 satisfy the
It

requirement 0f standing, a petitioner must allege 0r demonstrate an injury in fact

and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested Will prevent 0r
redress the claimed injury. Standing requires a showing 0f a distinct palpable
injury and fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed injury and the
challenged conduct. This Court has deﬁned palpable injury as an injury that is
easily perceptible, manifest, 0r readily Visible. The injury cannot be one suffered
alike by all citizens in the jurisdiction. There must be a fairly traceable causal
connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct. An interest, as
a concerned citizen, in seeing that the government abides by the law does not
confer standing.

Coal. for Agric.

citations

’s

Future

Canyon

v.

Cly.,

160 Idaho 142, 146, 369 P.3d 920, 924 (2016)(interna1

and quotations omitted). Furthermore, standing can never be assumed based on a

merely hypothetical
(2015). “Indeed,

injury. State

when

standing

v.

is

Philip Morris, Ina, 158 Idaho 874, 882, 354 P.3d 187, 195

challenged,

mere

allegations are not sufﬁcient,

invoking the court’s jurisdiction must demonstrate facts supporting this allegation.”

The

allegations in

Ms. Raymond’s Complaint do not show a

and the party
Id.

“fairly traceable causal

connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct,” and are based 0n several
hypotheticals. For example,

Ms. Raymond speculates

that,

but for ISP’s alleged interference, not

only would have the prosecutor chosen to prosecute Deputy Sloan, a jury would have convicted
him, Which would have

and would have resulted
fees,

made Ms. Raymond’s

civil case against

in a plaintiff’s verdict (in a case

and higher damages

in her

Deputy Sloan

0f comparative

wrongful death case. Ms.

Raymond

due

fault),

lower attorney

explicitly relies

hypotheticals in support of her claims and does not cite t0 any facts,
establish that she has suffered an actual injury

easier t0 prove,

0n these

beyond speculation,

t0

t0 ISP’S alleged conduct.

Furthermore, Ms. Raymond’s Complaint does not describe any individual act by ISP t0
support her allegations of misconduct. Ms.

Raymond

does not identify a witness 0r piece 0f

evidence that was allegedly tampered with. While this Court must liberally construe Ms.

Raymond’s Complaint

Law

Ofﬁce, P.A.

Raymond

v.

to “secure a just,

speedy and inexpensive resolution of the case,” Seiniger

N. Pac. Ins. C0., 145 Idaho 241, 246, 178 P.3d 606, 611 (2008), Ms.

asks this Court t0 ignore the actual language contained in the Complaint, wherein she

speciﬁcally alleges that ISP’S conduct prevented a prosecutor from charging Deputy Sloan and,
in turn, prevented a jury

from convicting him, Which made her wrongful death case more

difﬁcult t0 prove. Reading the Complaint as

just,

Ms. Raymond urges on appeal does not secure a

speedy, and inexpensive resolution 0f the case. Rather, ﬁnding a cause of action based on

the language 0f Ms.

decisions

criminal

made by

Raymond’s Complaint would

inappropriately invite a jury to speculate about

a prosecutor not to pursue criminal charges and the outcome of a hypothetical

trial.

The

district court correctly

found that Ms. Raymond’s claims against ISP were premised

on pure speculation, which could not form a lawful basis
other words, Ms.

that,

for a valid claim. R. Vol.

Raymond’s claims were based 0n a conclusory and

1, p.

113. In

speculative hypothetical,

but for ISP’S alleged interference with Deputy Sloan’s criminal case, not only would have

10

the prosecutor chosen to proceed with a criminal case, a jury would have convicted Deputy Sloan
of manslaughter, resulting in a plaintiff’s verdict for Ms. Raymond, greater damages, and fewer
costs in her civil case. See R. Vol. I, p. 33, ¶ 19.
The district court also correctly held that Ms. Raymond’s claims were premature. R. Vol.
1, p. 113. At the time of her lawsuit, Ms. Raymond had not yet suffered any injury, nor was she
likely to, because the outcome of the civil case had not yet been decided. Id. In other words,
because Ms. Raymond’s injury was predicated on the expense and outcome of her wrongful
death claim, her Complaint did not demonstrate that she had suffered a distinct injury at the time
of its filing, or that she was likely to suffer a distinct injury in the future. Accordingly, Ms.
Raymond’s speculative allegations are not sufficient to demonstrate that she had suffered an
injury-in-fact necessary to establish standing to pursue claims against ISP. See, Martin v. Camas
Cty. ex rel. Bd. Comm’rs, 150 Idaho 508, 514, 248 P.3d 1243, 1249 (2011) (a plaintiff did not
have standing because alleged injury of “increased competition” was “thoroughly speculative”
and was not “specific or distinct and palpable.”).
Ms. Raymond’s allegations of “reduced damages” and “increased attorney fees” also do
not constitute an “injury-in-fact” because they cannot be established by known facts. See, Philip
Morris, Inc., 158 Idaho 874, 882, 354 P.3d 187, 195 (2015). To the contrary, the only way for
Ms. Raymond to establish injury would be to compare the outcome of a hypothetical civil case
that took place after a hypothetical criminal conviction, to the outcome of another civil case that
has yet to take place. Such an alleged injury is not visible, palpable, distinct, or sufficient to
establish standing. Rather, it is based on conjecture and guesswork. Accordingly, the district
court did not err when it dismissed Ms. Raymond’s claim for tortious interference with a
prospective civil action for failure to state a valid claim.
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This Court should not adopt a

III.

civil

by spoliation 0f evidence because such a tort would create endless
and because the facts of this case d0 not support such a tort.

For several reasons,
civil action

tort for intentional interference with a

action

litigation

With a

new

by

this

Court should not adopt a

new

tort for intentional interference

spoliation of evidence. First, adoption of such a tort

endless litigation where the

same

facts

and issues are contested

is

likely to lead t0

in several different venues.

Second, other sufﬁcient remedies are available to deter such interference, including criminal

laws punishing those
facts

Who

conceal or destroy evidence 0r intimidate Witnesses. In addition, the

0f this case d0 not warrant the adoption 0f a

new

cause tort for intentional interference with

a civil action.

The adoption 0f intentional interference With a prospective
will lead t0 endless, burdensome litigation.

A.

In Yoakum, this Court relied in part

0n Smith, supra, the seminal California case

that ﬁrst

The holding

in Smith

recognized a claim for interference With a prospective

was

later

civil action

civil action in 1984.

disapproved in the “ﬁrst-party spoliation” context. See, Cedars—Sinai Med.

Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 521

& n.

the tort 0f “third-party spoliation,”

which

See Temple Cmty. Hosp.

v.

4 (1998). Also
is

most akin

tort

—

to the circumstances

in this case,

Who

is

v.

Yoakum, California ﬂatly rejected

Superior Court, 976 P.2d 223, 225 (1999).

claim alleges destruction 0f evidence by someone
underlying

after

Ctr.

of the instant appeal.

A third-party

spoliation

not alleged to have committed the

ISP would be considered a third party because Ms.

Raymond

did

not allege that ISP’S conduct proximately caused the accident resulting in her father’s death.
Rather, Ms.

Raymond

alleges that ISP’S conduct in the criminal investigation interfered with her

wrongful death case against Deputy Sloan and Fayette County.
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In Temple, the Court described the “endless spirals 0f lawsuits over litigation-related

conduct” that resulted With the adoption 0f intentional third-party spoliation claims.
at

229.

The Court recognized

the

harm

in depriving a party

Id.,

0f evidence supporting

976 P.2d

their claim,

but nonetheless considered the “greater harm 0f subjecting parties, witnesses and the courts t0

unending

litigation

over the conduct and outcome 0f a lawsuit.”

Id., at

230.

It

further identiﬁed

“the uncertainty 0f the fact 0f harm” that occurs in cases alleging third-party spoliation. Citing

its

decision in Cedars-Sinai, supra, the Temple Court held:

As

0f spoliation 0f evidence by a party, in the case 0f third party
seems likely that in a substantial proportion 0f spoliation cases the
fact 0f harm will be irreducibly uncertain. In such cases, even if the jury infers
from the act of spoliation that the spoliated evidence was somehow unfavorable
[to a party], there Will typically be n0 way 0f telling What precisely the evidence
would have shown and how much it would have weighed in the spoliation
Victim’s favor. Without knowing the content and weight 0f the spoliated evidence,
it would be impossible for the jury t0 meaningﬁllly assess What role the missing
evidence would have played in the determination of the underlying action. The
jury could only speculate as t0 What the nature 0f the spoliated evidence was and
what effect it might have had on the outcome of the underlying litigation.
in the case

spoliation “[i]t

Id., at

230 (emphasis added).

The Court had

further

concerns about the element of causation being subject t0

speculation, stating that “the extent t0

in the underlying litigation

which the destruction of evidence caused a

would be a matter 0f speculation.”

Id. at

23 1. Ultimately, the Temple

Court held that California’s lower courts were mistaken in recognizing a
spoliation 0f evidence

by analogizing

economic advantage (which
tort

was “possible”

is

it

to the tort

precisely what the

in Idaho. Id., at 231). Considering all

13

tort

of intentional

0f intentional interference With prospective

Yaakum Court did When

California’s 14 years 0f experience With the tort, the

different result

it

opined that such a

0f these factors above, including

Temple Court

held:

As we have seen, the injury in the case of spoliation is speculative. A litigant’s
expectancy in the outcome of litigation is peculiarly uncertain, being subject to
the discretion of court and jury. Whether interference with the prospective
advantage of prevailing in a lawsuit is committed by a party to the litigation or
instead by a stranger to the litigation, the claimed fact of damage — loss or
impairment of a hoped-for civil verdict — is equally speculative.
Id. The Temple Court acknowledged the additional burdens and costs of such a speculative cause
of action, including jury confusion, potential for frivolous lawsuits, and the overall burden on the
legal system, including the “inaccurate instrument of derivative tort litigation” and the
“potentially endless litigation over a speculative loss” that would result from such claims. Id., at
231-233.
The majority of jurisdictions who have addressed this issue have declined to adopt an
intentional spoliation claim for the same or similar reasons set forth in Temple. See, Koplin v.
Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 734 P.2d 1177, 1183 (Kan. 1987) (tort of “intentional interference
with a prospective civil action by spoliation of evidence” was not recognized, absent duty or
special relationship of the parties); Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components,
Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434, 438-39 (Minn.1990) (declined to allow an independent tort to continue
prior to resolution of the underlying case, due to concerns about speculation); Trevino v. Ortega,
969 S.W.2d 950, 951–52 (Tex.1998) (declining to recognize a tort that would lead to duplicate
litigation and insufficient re-litigation of the same issues); Dowdle Butane Gas Co. v. Moore,
831 So. 2d 1124, 1135-36 (Miss. 2002) (declining to adopt the tort due to uncertainty of harm
and interest of finality in adjudication); O'Neal v. Remington Arms Co., LLC, No. CIV. 11-4182KES, 2012 WL 3834842, at *3 (D.S.D. Sept. 4, 2012) (recognizing persuasive rationale by
majority of states who have declined to adopt the new tort).
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This Court should likewise decline to adopt a

burdensome, endless

litigation

Ms. Raymond be allowed

B.

Remedies

to

over speculative

loss.

This

new
is

would

tort that

precisely

likely lead t0

What would occur should

proceed on her claim.

Other remedies are available to deter the destruction of evidence.

exist to address the types

of allegations that Ms.

Raymond

raises in her

Complaint. In particular, state and Federal criminal statutes outlaw the destruction of evidence,

tampering With Witnesses, and other forms 0f misconduct that Ms.

Raymond

alleges in her

Complaint. Indeed, she cites t0 the Violation 0f such statutes as “an element” 0f her claim for
intentional interference with a prospective Civil action. See, e.g.

18 U.S.C. § 1512 (federal

criminal statute prohibiting tampering With a Witness, Victim, 0r informant); LC. § 2603 (state
criminal statue prohibiting the destruction, alteration, 0r concealment of evidence); LC. § 2604
(state criminal statute prohibiting intimidation

0f a Witness);

I.C. §

2605

(state criminal statute

prohibiting the bribery 0f witnesses)?

The Temple Court identiﬁed these
third-party destruction 0f evidence

not acting on behalf of a party but
to interfere in the

outcome 0f

existing remedies

and further held

that

such cases 0f

were not a signiﬁcant problem because “the nonparty who
is

independently motivated to destroy evidence with the intent

litigation

between other

parties

must be a

rarity,

perhaps because

such destruction can subject the nonparty to criminal prosecution.” Temple, 976 P.2d

That

is

particularly true in this case.

Ms. Raymond does not allege

Deputy Sloan 0r Fayette County With the

2

is

that

at

232.

ISP acted 0n behalf 0f

requisite premeditation or plan t0 interfere in the

Despite the Complaint’s one random reference t0 “defendants” destroying evidence, Ms.

Raymond

did not cite t0 I.C. § 18-2603 as a statute violated by ISP, Which further demonstrates
that Ms. Raymond’s Complaint has not properly alleged that ISP intentionally destroyed
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wrongful death lawsuit. Ricketts, 137 Idaho
relies

581, 51 P.3d at 395—96. Rather, the Complaint

at

on speculation and does not identify any valid motivation

for ISP to conceal or destroy

evidence or otherwise interfere in the criminal investigation of Deputy Sloan.

The

C.

facts

of this case do not merit the adoption of a

new tort

in Idaho.

A review of case law around the country has not revealed a similar case Where a plaintiff
established a cognizable claim for spoliation

by

alleging that third party interference prevented a

criminal conviction which thereby deprived the plaintiff of recovery in a subsequent civil case.

Indeed, other states

Who have

supra (recognizing the

adopted

tort in a case

this tort

where an

have not done so 0n those

dismissal 0f criminal charges against plaintiff); Oliver

(Mont. 1999) (recognizing the

tort,

was alleged

arrest tape

but declining t0

0f facts. See, Hazen,

have been altered

it

when

plaintiff could not establish that

defendant had intentionally destroyed evidence for the purpose of disrupting a third-party

Hannah

v.

Heeter,

584 S.E.2d 560, 573 (W.Va.2003) (recognizing intentional

cautioning that party injured

evidence was destroyed

v.

by

spoliation

— must show an

after

Stimson Lumber C0., 993 P.2d 11, 22

v.

ﬁnd

t0

set

must show more than the

intent to defeat a

suit);

tort,

fact that the potential

pending or potential lawsuit); Rizzuto

Davidson Ladders, Ina, 905 A.2d 1165, 1178 (Conn. 2006)

(tort

recognized

When

third party

destroyed ladder in a products liability case after repeated requests from plaintiff t0 preserve

Adopting a
party

who

tort

0n the allegations raised

in

Ms. Raymond’s Complaint allows

down

the road.

lawsuits Where any investigator performing their job

evidence, Which the
at

for

it).

any

disagrees with the outcome of a criminal investigation to assert a claim for

interference with a potential civil case

Idaho

but

As

discussed above, that invites frivolous

is

subject t0 liability if the investigation

Yoakum Court recognized was necessary

424, 923 P.2d at 179.
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t0 pursue

such a claim. See 129

does not result in the indictment
a subsequent civil

suit.3

w

conviction 0f a party

who may

also

be subject

to liability in

In order to avoid such frivolous lawsuits and in order to establish a valid

claim for the type 0f “unreasonable interference” considered by the Yaakum Court, a plaintiff

must

allege

more than conclusory

allegations of misconduct.

Ms. Raymond’s Complaint makes one random allegation of destruction 0f evidence,
Without any reference to ISP in particular, and does not identify the evidence allegedly destroyed
or

how

such evidence was

Vital t0

her civil case. In other cases where spoliation was found to be

a valid claim, destruction 0f evidence
See, e.g. Rizutto, supra;

was

Hannah, supra;

the

main component and

central allegation in the case.

vague allegations as true and assuming that ISP destroyed evidence favorable

and

MS. Raymond’s

Oliver, supra. Furthermore, taking

that all hypotheticals turn out in her favor,

t0

Ms. Raymond

Deputy Sloan’s conviction does not guarantee her

a plaintiff’s verdict 0n her wrongful death claim, particularly in the context of comparative

Accordingly, Ms. Raymond’s Complaint does not necessitate the adoption of a

new

tort

fault.

on these

facts.

Importantly, and as discussed above, Ms.

wrongful death lawsuit was allowed t0

move

Raymond

cannot establish injury-in-fact. Her

forward, and she ultimately reached a settlement

with the remaining co-defendants on her wrongful death claim. Allowing
a

new

tort

would require a jury

What damages,

if any,

t0 speculate regarding the

is

Ms. Raymond’s claims 0f tortious interference with a prospective

investigation,

which has been expressly rejected
App. 1992); Hagy

(Ct.

App. 2002).
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in Idaho.
v.

State,

t0 trial With a

problematic for several reasons.

civil action

with a prospective economic advantage are also attempts t0 plead around the
25, 841 P.2d 453, 454-55 (Ct.

proceed on

comparative fault 0f the drivers and

Ms. Raymond would have recovered had she proceeded

hypothetical criminal conviction for Deputy Sloan. This

3

this case to

Wimer

v.

State,

It

and interference
of negligent

tort

122 Idaho 923, 924-

137 Idaho 618, 622, 51 P.3d 432, 436

would require astounding speculation on the part of the jury. A jury would be asked to ignore the
many potential outcomes of both a criminal and civil trial, based on several factors, including the
evidence presented, credibility of witnesses, jury instructions, rulings by the court, and argument
presented by counsel. Ms. Raymond would then ask a jury to presume that, had such a
prosecution gone forward and a jury convicted Deputy Sloan on the facts presented, she would
have prevailed at trial, her damages would have been much greater, and her path to recover
would have been much easier. Such hypotheticals and intangible damages are not the
circumstances contemplated by the Restatement (Second) or by this Court when it considered a
potential new tort for interference with a prospective civil action.
In Hills v. United Parcel Serv., 232 P.3d 1049, 1058 (Utah, 2010), the Utah Supreme
Court of Utah viewed favorably the policy reasons for adopting the independent tort for “thirdparty spoliation,” but nevertheless declined to do so on the facts of that particular case. Similarly,
this Court should not adopt a new tort for intentional interference with a civil action for
spoliation of evidence on the facts of this case.
IV.

The district court properly dismissed Ms. Raymond’s claim for tortious
interference with economic advantage.

Ms. Raymond’s Complaint sets forth two “intentional interference” claims against ISP,
both of which the district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. Ms. Raymond only argues
on appeal that Count II of her Complaint was erroneously dismissed and that the Idaho Supreme
Court should create an intentional tort, giving rise to that claim. It does not appear that Ms.
Raymond is appealing the district court’s dismissal of her claim for intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage. “Issues on appeal are not considered unless they are properly
supported by both authority and argument.” Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 18,
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278 P.3d 415, 420 (2012). Nevertheless, for the same reasons

as set forth above,

Ms. Raymond’s

claim for tortious interference With prospective economic advantage was also properly dismissed

by the

district court.

The elements
The existence 0f a
the interferer;

interference

(3)

for a claim of intentional interference with

valid economic expectancy; (2)

an economic expectancy

knowledge of the expectancy 0n the part of

intentional interference inducing termination of the

was wrongful by some measure beyond

are: (1)

expectancy; (4) the

the fact of the interference itself (i.e. that the

defendant interfered for an improper purpose 0r improper means) and (5) resulting damage t0 the
plaintiff

whose expectancy has been

Highland Enterprises,

disrupted.

Inc.

v.

Barker, 133 Idaho

330, 338, 986 P.2d 996, 1004 (1999) (emphasis added).

The

district court

dismissed Ms. Raymond’s claims for several reasons.

court determined that Ms.

death

suit.

The court

Raymond

First, the district

could not have a valid economic expectancy in her wrongful

further determined that

Count held dismissal 0f Count

III

was warranted

because Ms. Raymond’s wrongful death action was premised 0n a fact she should not prove:

“That but for the Defendants’ alleged misconduct, Sloan would have been convicted of
manslaughter.” R. V01.
asserted because the

I,

p. 113. Finally, the district court

held that Count

outcome of her wrongful death case was not known

III

at the

was prematurely
time she ﬁled her

claims against ISP. Id. For those reasons and those discussed below, the court’s dismissal 0f

Count

III

was not

As

in error.

set forth above,

Ms. Raymond does not have standing

with an economic advantage.

As held by

the district court,

on a hypothetical criminal conviction and how

it
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to bring a claim for interference

Ms. Raymond’s expectancy

is

based

could have impacted her ability t0 prove her

wrongful death claim, Which had yet t0 be decided. Such reliance on hypothetical outcomes
cannot give rise to a valid economic interference claim.
Furthermore, Ms. Raymond’s Complaint did not sufﬁciently allege the essential elements

of an economic advantage claim. For the same reasons Ms.

Raymond does

not have standing t0

pursue her claim, she has not alleged a valid economic expectancy in her wrongful death lawsuit.

Her recovery

is

based 0n hypothetical outcomes 0f a criminal

trial

and her alleged “resulting

damages,” cannot be determined with any reasonable certainty and are based 0n speculation. See
Trilogy

Network

Sys.,

Inc.

v.

Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 846, 172 P.3d 1119, 1121 (2007)

(damages must be proved with a reasonable certainty and the existence 0f damages “must be
taken out 0f the realm 0f speculation”). Such speculative injury cannot form the basis of a Llid
CCOHOIIliC CXDCCtanCV.

In addition, a civil lawsuit

is

not akin to the types of valid economic relationships that

claims in Idaho. See, Highland Enterprises, Ina, 133 Idaho

at

338, 986 P.2d at 1004 (1999) (plaintiff contractor alleged defendants’ protests interfered with

its

have given

rise to interference

expected proﬁts); Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc.

v.

Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 893, 243 P.3d 1069,

1081 (2010) (plaintiff employer alleged defendants intentionally interfered With

employee
P.3d

relationships); Syringa Networks,

499,

508

(2013)

(plaintiff

LLC v.

Fox

v.

Country Mut.

Ins. C0.,

protect the integrity 0f “voluntagy

that

would have veg

its

’t

company

ability t0 subcontract

customer and

155 Idaho 55, 64, 305
alleged

defendant

With a third party). See

7 P.3d 677, 690 (Ore. 2000) (the purpose 0f such a claim

economic

relationships, both

likely resulted in a pecuniary

interference”) (emphasis added);

Dep 0fAdmin.,

telecommunications

telecommunications company interfered With
also,

Idaho

its

Cron

v.

beneﬁt

commercial and noncommercial,

t0 the plaintiff but for the defendant’s

Zimmer, 296 P.3d 567, 576 (Ore. 2013) (same).
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is to

Ms. Raymond
terminated, Which

is

also fails t0 allege that her ability to prove her wrongful death case

was

an essential element t0 her claim. Highland Enterprises, Ina, 133 Idaho

338, 986 P.2d at 1004. In

fact,

Sloan and Fayette County

Ms. Raymond has acknowledged

moved forward and

that

that her claim against

at

Deputy

she reached an eventual settlement.

Accordingly, her economic advantage by deﬁnition was not terminated and thus, she has failed
to state a cognizable claim.

CONCLUSION
Defendant ISP respectfully requests that

this

Court afﬁrm the

district court’s

decision

dismissing With prejudice Ms. Raymond’s claims against ISP for tortious interference With a
prospective action and tortious interference With prospective economic advantage.

DATED this 3rd day 0f May, 2019.
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